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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF BUILDERS' CONTRACTS
HOWARD L. OLECKt
IN 1920, Roscoe Pound, writing on the subject of the progress of law
and equity, touched on the problem of specific performance of con-
tracts to build or repair.1 Concerning this problem he observed that
"one of the stock objections in construction contracts is want of sufficient
certainty."2 He explained the origin of this objection to the granting
of specific performance as follows:
When the English Chancellors were struggling to establish the juris-
diction of Chancery (equity) as a court separate from the existing
"law" courts, it was imperative that the dignity of the new courts be
maintained. Any order issued by the Chancellor which he could not
be certain of being able to enforce would jeopardize this dignity. Ac-
cordingly, he avoided decrees for affirmative performance of anything
beyond a single act. If a decree did require performance of detailed
acts, the execution of the details had to be supervised. From this attitude
arose the notion that equity was obliged to supervise the performance
of each detail of any action required by its decree. This idea had two
consequences: because the court sought to avoid prolonged supervision
which its ordinary means and instrumentalities might not be able to
carry out, it became prejudiced against the idea of specific performance
of construction contracts. In addition a prejudice developed against all
affirmative decrees involving more than a single, simple act, and at the
same time the court tended to prefer negative decrees wherever possible.
Despite the eventual abandonment of this idea in England, it remained
a fundamental principle of equity in this country. Moreover, because
the courts here have felt that they ought not to remake contracts but
only to enforce them, they have required that every detail of performance
be fixed, so that the courts can supervise and exact each detail without
t Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. Pound, Progress of The Law-Equity, 33 HARV. L. REV. 420, 432 (1920). The
antiquity of the concept of specific performance of building contracts is illustrated by
an excerpt from the ancient Code of Hammurabi, (circa 2250 B.C.) Rule 233: "If a
builder has built a house for some one and has not made its foundations firm, and a
wall falls, that builder out of his own money shall make firm that wall." 1 HisTouANs'
HISTORY OF = WORLD 511 (Williams ed. 1907). The English Chancellors specifically
enforced agreements from an early date. Hazeltine, Early History of English Equity In
EssAYs IN LEcAL HISTORY 261, 269-70 (Vinogradoff ed. 1913); Barbour, Some Aspects
of 15th Century Equity, 31 HARv. L. REv. 831, 848-9 (1918).
2. Pound, supra note 1, at 433. But see STONE, PROVINCE AND FUNCrION or LAW 546
(1950), in which it is suggested that the interests of personal freedom and the efficiency
of judicial institutions are of equal importance. For historical background see Oleck,
Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FoRD. L. REV. 23 (1951).
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altering the contract. As a result the older cases were overly squeamish
about certainty of details. Jones v. Parker et al.,' decided in 1895 by
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, was a landmark case
in that it represented a turning point of American legal opinion in
this respect. It held that, if there existed an objective standard capable
of determination and application by experts, the contract might be
specifically enforced.4
In his conclusion, Pound commented that "... the exigencies of
judicial administration of justice will sooner or later fequire resort
to modem machinery despite all technical and historical objections."'
In this conclusion, as in so many others, Pound demonstrated the
penetrating insight and vision which have made him famous. Although
the law moved with ponderous slowness in the direction indicated by
him, it did move. Now, some thirty-two years later, his prophecy
has become a fact, albeit in a manner somewhat different from what
he may have contemplated.
As Pound sensed, the courts were not averse to remedying the
wrongs inherent in many denials of specific performance. The difficulty
lay in the "how" of such cases, rather than in the "why." How could
a court render justice effectively when the very nature of the remedy
required made its practical enforcement futile?
In the decades after Jones v. Parker et al.,6 the courts struggled
manfully, but not very successfully, with this problem. It remained,
and remains true that building contracts are not generally specifically
enforced, because the courts will not attempt to enforce decrees which
require extended supervision of numerous details.! Yet, at the same
3. 163 Mass. 564, 40 N. E. 1044 (1895), cited by the court in Strauss v. Estates of
Long Beach, 187 App. Div. 876, 176 N. Y. Supp. 447 (2d Dep't 1919), on which Pound
commented in his article. See Pound, supra note 1. In the Strauss case the defendant
had relied on Beck et al. v. Allison, 56 N. Y. 366 (1874). The Strauss case was an action
to compel the defendant to build a sewer system. Judgment had been granted in favor
of the defendant on the ground that the "supervision and control of the court would
be . . . difficult, if not impracticable." Strauss v. Estates of Long Beach, 105 Mlisc. 398,
400, 173 N. Y. Supp. 142, 143 (Sup. CL 1918). The appellate court reversed the judg-
ment, citing as authority for its ruling, Union Pac. Ry. et al. v. Chicago, R. L & Pac.
Ry., 163 U. S. 564 (1896); Jones v. Parker et al., 163 Mass. 564, 40 N. E. 1044
(1895); Prospect Park and C. I. Ry. v. Coney Island & B. I. R, 144 N. Y. 152, 39
N. E. 17 (1894); Lawrence et al. v. Saratoga Lake Ry., 36 Hun 467 (N. Y. 1885); and
Stuyvesant v. The Mayor et al., 11 Paige 414 (N. Y. 1845).
4. See Pound, supra note 1, at 434.
5. Pound, supra note 1, at 436.
6. 163 Mass. 564, 40 N. E. 1044 (1895).
7. Texas and Pac. Ry. v. Marshall, 136 U. S. 393 (1890); 4 Posxaoy, EQun JURLS-
PRUDENcE 1038 (5th ed. 1941); PoFreaoy, SPEcnc PmroR1uA ;,c 61 (3d ed. 1926). It
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time, equity courts always have regarded money damages as inadequate
relief for breach of a promise to transfer any interest in specific real
property.' But the need for a more satisfactory solution has been rec-
ognized even while the general rule has been followed, perforce.
Accordingly, certain exceptions to the general rule have been developed.
Such exceptions are available for building and construction contracts.'
Of such contracts Pomeroy states that ". . . it has been said that if
an agreement for erecting a building is in its nature defined, there is
no difficulty in entertaining a suit for its performance."10 The English
courts, more advanced than ours in this respect, have recognized and
enforced specific performance in several classes of cases, viz.: (1)
where the construction contract is certain and defined; (2) where the
defendant has agreed to build a well-defined structure on his own land
and the plaintiff has a material interest therein which is not susceptible
of adequate compensation in damages; (3) where the defendant has
agreed to do such building on land acquired from the plaintiff for this
purpose; and (4) where there is part performance and the defendant
has received some benefits in specie.1 Some American courts have
recognized these exceptions in situations in which relief at law would
be inadequate, and in which the right to performance is shown.1"
But until now, the English treatment of this problem has been distinctly
in advance of our development.13
is interesting to note that plaintiffs have won less than one-half of contested actions for
specific performance, as compared with 82% of contract cases, 75% of automobile
negligence cases, and 54% of other negligence cases, as revealed by the statistics given
in HURST, GROWTH OF AM.ERICA LAW 173 (1950), citing CLARK AND SLVaMONS, STUDY
OF LAW ADM.INIsTRATIoN IN CONNECTICUT 22-32, 43-9 (1937).
8. RESTATFZIENT, CONTRACTS § 360 (1932); 4 PoalEoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENOC 1039
(5th ed. 1941).
9. PomERoy, SpEcIFC PERFORMANCE 61 (2d ed. 1926).
10. Id. at 63.
11. 4 PomxRoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1038 (5th ed. 1941).
12. 4 ibid. See also Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1 (1890). In the latter case the
Supreme Court of the United States, consisting of eight of the nine justices who decided
Texas and Pac. Ry. v. Marshall, 136 U. S. 393 (1890), granted specific performance of a
construction contract, as the remedy and damages at law would be entirely inadequate,
"and nothing short of the interposition of a court of equity would provide for the
exigencies of the situation." Id. at 49. See also Herzog et al. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R.,
153 Cal. 496, 95 Pac. 898 (1908); Taylor et al. v. Florida'East Coast Ry., 54 Fla. 635,
45 So. 574, (1907) ; Jones v. Parker et al., 163 Mass. 564, 40 N. E. 1044 (1895) ; Beck et al.
v. Allison, 56 N. Y. 366 (1874); Rector of St. David's Church v. Wood, 24 Ore. 396,
34 Pac. 18 (1893); 9 Am. JuR. 77 (1937).
13. Gilchester Properties, Ltd. v. Gomm, 1948, 92 SOL. J. 220; Specific Performance with
Compensation, 93 SOL. J. 262; see also Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 VimT. c. 66,
§§ 24-5; and 46 & 47 VIcT. c. 49 (1883), which revised Chancery Amendment Act, 1858,
21 & 22 VICT. c. 27, § 2 (Lord Cairn's Act).
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Nevertheless, it is true that both state and federal American courts
of equity generally have enforced contracts to build, and contracts
calling for performance of numerous acts over an extended period of
time, provided that the nature of the construction or the acts or work
to be done have been sufficiently defined.' In this respect the English
and American cases have been in harmony."0 The American federal
courts have been especially emphatic in support of this view, and in
recognition of the necessity for the adaptation of judicial machinery
to deal with increasingly complex problems of this type.10 In Kearns-
Gorsuck Bottle Co. v. Hartford-Fairviont Co.,'7 the federal view was
stated comprehensively yet tersely, as follows:
". .. defendant urges ... that specific performance cannot be ordered because
by so doing the court would require from both parties and would be required to
supervise, 'the exercise of skill, personal labor and experienced judgment in the
continuous operation of a manufacturing business.'. . . . The law does move with
the times and usually moves first in the lower courts; .... For me the statement
(or perhaps dictum) of Life Preserver, etc., Co. v. National, etc., Co.18 still represents
the present state of the law, viz., protracted supervision of a business should not
be assumed, but it is not true that it cannot be assumed. Everything depends on
how insistently the justice of the case demands the court's assumptions of difticult,
unfamiliar, and contentious business problems. The tendency of the times is to
'take on' harder and longer jobs.'19 As a Judge of first instance I would not nowadays
hesitate to undertake any business enterprise for which, with the support of competent
receivers, I thought a reasonably intelligent Judge reasonably fit."'20
Parenthetically, it should be added that the "rule" against "extended
supervision" is a discretionary principle of decision and not a limitation
on jurisdiction. In other words, if an appellate court should reverse an
extreme "discretionary order" based on the exception to the rule against
supervision, such reversal could only lbgically or lawfully rest on an
14. joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. I (8sgo); South & North Ala. R. R. et at. v. Highland
Ave. and B. R. R., 98 Ala. 400, 13 So. 682 (1893); Busey's Ex'r v. McCurley, 61 Md.
436 (1883); Prospect Park and C. I. R. R. v. Coney Island and B. R. R., 144 N. Y. 152,
39 N. E. 17 (1894); Lawrence et a!. v. Saratoga Lake Ry., 36 Hun 467 (N. Y. 1835);
Stuyvesant v. The Mayor et a., 11 Paige 414 (N. Y. 1845); Municipal Gas Co. v. Lone
Star Gas Co., 259 S. W. 684 (Tex. 1924); Birchett et al. v. Bolling, 5 Munf. 442 (Va.
1817); and see Note, 25 IowA L. Rav. 766, 771 (1940).
15. Wolverhampton v. Emmons, [I901] 1 K. B. 515 (C. A.); Hepburn v. Leather, 50
L. T. 660 (Ch. 1884); Cubitt v. Smith, 10 Jur. (.,z. s.) 1123, 11 L. T. 298 (1864); Mosely
v. Virgin, 3 Ves. 184, 30 Eng. Rep. 959 (1796). See also American cases cited note 14 supra.
16. Union Pac. Ry. et al. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 163 U. S. 564, 600 (1896); Joy
v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1 (1890); Great Lakes & St. Lawrence Transp. Co. et al. v. Scranton
Coal Co., 239 Fed. 603 (7th Cir. 1917).
17. 1 F. 2d 318 (S. D. N. Y. 1921).
18. 252 Fed. 139 (2d Cir. 1918).
19. At this point a number of illustrative cases were cited.
20. Kearns-Gorsuch Bottle Co. v. Hartford-Fairmont Co., I F. 2d 318, 319 (S. D. N. Y.
1921) (opinion per Hough, J.).
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ascertained abuse of discretion; the error would be in degree, not in
kind.2' Moreover, it should be clear that denial of equitable relief as
a matter of discretion would entitle a plaintiff to alternative legal relief
or money damages.
A summation of what has been stated hereinabove, at this point,
would reveal no especially remarkable progress by the courts in dealing
with the problem of specific performance of builders' contracts. The
principal advance seems to have occurred immediately after the close
of World War I. This would coincide with the relatively limited build-
ing boom which followed World War I. The speculative boom of the
nineteen twenties and the depression of the nineteen thirties resulted
in little building, and correspondingly little litigation of building con-
tracts. The first half of the nineteen forties, the period of World War
II, again, saw little construction work of a private nature being done, al-
though there was considerable public building. But then came the post-
World War II boom, and with it such an expansion of private building
as this nation never before had seen. Throughout the country housing
"developments" mushroomed. Each development required a number
of individual building contracts; the aggregate, nationwide, totaling
many thousands of contracts. Inevitably, disputes and litigation arose,
and the courts were faced again with the problem of specific perform-
ance of builders' contracts.
The recent unprecedented number of private building contracts have
been characterized by the fact that most of them were entered into by
buyers of limited financial means. At the same time many builders
have formed special building corporations to deal with their various
specific home or "development" projects. These corporations, in many
cases, survive the completion of construction and the closing of titles
for only a short space of time. In almost all such construction con-
tracts nowadays prudent builders seek to secure themselves against
mounting material and labor costs. This usually is done by the method
of inserting into the contract a clause denying any right to damages
to the buyer, in case of delay or non-completion by the builder, if the
default is the result of strikes or other causes "beyond the control of
the builder." Many of these contracts have been (and still are being)
entered into by buyers who were (and are) driven by imperative need
for decent living quarters, or by wifely insistence that the enjoyment
of "the better life" no longer be postponed.22
21. Id. at 320. See also Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 157 N. Y. 60,
51 N. E. 408 (1898); Municipal Gas Co. v. Lone Star Gas Co., 259 S. W. 684, 690 (Tex.
1924).
22. These facts, especially as they recently applied to veterans of World War II, are
too well-known to need documentation here.
[Vol. 21
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There can be little doubt that a veteran of World War II, in the
years immediately following the war's end, had relatively little interest
in the remedy of damages when, for any reason, his builder failed to
complete and deliver the house the veteran needed. He needed a home,
not a lawsuit. Nevertheless, on first inspection the law seemed of little
help on this score.' Damages seemed to be the only remedy, in many
cases. 4 Despite a few exceptions, the rule against specific enforcement
seemed to be undefeatable, as yet, despite the efforts of Pound and
other progressive spirits.7 The exceptions, while helpful in a few
situations, were too limited to be of much practical utility in the
majority of cases.20
Had this been all, a plaintiff-buyer would have been hard put to
obtain redress in case of even a deliberate default by the defendant-
builder-vendor. In fact, many cases of hardship without adequate
remedy must have occurred, never to come to public notice. However,
there has existed for many years another provision of law which has
held the key to the solution of this dilemma, but which has long re-
mained not applied to this situation. In many American jurisdictions
the right of a plaintiff in a bill in equity to have damages assessed in
lieu of, or concurrently with specific relief has long been recognized.-
This also has been true in England for almost a century past.' The
possibilities suggested by the application of this principle to problems
of specific performance of construction contracts are many.
Unfortunately, the idea of damages in lieu of specific performance
is quite readily translatable into the idea of abatement. For example,
in the well-known case of World Exhibit Corp. v. City Bank Farmers
23. See St. Regis Paper Co. v. Santa Clara Lumber Co., 186 N. Y. 89, 78 N. E. 701
(1906); Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 157 N. Y. 60, 51 N. E. 403 (1898);
Beck et al. v. Allison, 56 N. Y. 366 (1874); FRY, Spaciac Pamru&M&cE § 48 (2d ed.
1861); 2 SroRy, EQunT JISPRUDECE §§ 726-7 (13th ed. 1886).
24. 2 SEDEwicx, DAArEIES §§ 631, 643, 647, 993-4 (9th ed. 1920).
25. Pound, supra note 1, at 420, 426; George, Present Tendency Toward Specific En-
forcerzent of Building Contracts in Pennsylvania, 53 Dicz. L. REv. 143 (1949); PoiXEwoy,
SPEcc PEasoRmAcE § 23 (3d ed. 1926); Kearns-Gorsuch Bottle Co. v. Hartford-Fair-
mont Co., 1 F. 2d 318 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Village of Larchmont v. Larchmont Part, Inc,
185 App. Div. 330, 173 N. Y. Supp. 32 (2d Dep't 1918).
26. See note 25 supra; also WimLsTo, CONTRACTS § 1423 (rev. ed. 1936).
27. Sloan v. Baird, 162 N. Y. 327, 56 N. E. 752 (1900); Cooley v. Lobdell, 153
N.Y. 596, 47 N.E. 783 (1897); Barlow v. Scott, 24 N.Y. 40 (1861); Genet v. Howland,
45 Barb. Ch. 560 (N.Y. 1866). See also Pomamoy, SPncre PEroaa =CE §§ 47S-481 n.
(3d ed. 1926), for citations from other jurisdictions.
28. Gilchester Properties, Ltd. v. Gomm, 1948, 92 SoL.. J. 220; Spedfic Performance wiTh
Compensation, 93 Sor.. J. 262; see also Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vxcr. c. 66, §§ 24-5;
and 46 & 47 VIcr. c. 49 (1883), which revised Chancery Amendment Act, 1858, 21 & 22
VicT. c. 27, § 2 (Lord Cairn's Act).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Trust Co.,' specific performance with an abatement from the purchase
price was granted, because the vendor could not deliver all of what he
had contracted to deliver." The Restatement of Contracts states:
"The fact that a part of the promised performance cannot be rendered,
or is otherwise such that its specific performance would violate some
of the rules stated in §§ 360-380, 1 does not prevent the specific enforce-
ment of the remainder, if in all other respects the requisites for specific
performance of that remainder exist. Compensation for the partial
breach that still remains may be awarded in the same proceeding, either
as damages, restitution, or an abatement in price. An indemnity against
threatened future harm may also be required."32 But this is not the
same thing as the substitutional redress mentioned in the preceding
paragraph hereinabove. In the American code states, as in England,
today specific relief and substitutional redress may be had in the
same proceeding, as a result of statutes enacted over the last one
hundred years.3 Yet, this fusion of administration did not abolish
"the essential and permanent difference between legal and equitable
relief. For the distinction between a judgment that the plaintiff recover
land, chattels or money, and a judgment that the defendant do or
refrain from doing a certain thing is as vital and far-reaching as ever." 4
The theory of substitutional redress, rather than the allied theory of
abatement was the one which offered an astonishingly simple and direct
solution to the administrative difficulties surrounding the specific per-
formance of construction contracts.
29. 270 App. Div. 654, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 889 (2d Dep't), ag'd without opinion, 296
N. Y. 586, 68 N. E. 2d 876 (1946).
30. See Note, 21 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 104 (1946). Where, in a contract to sell, the
title proves defective to an inconsiderable part, the court will decree specific performance
with a ratable reduction of the purchase money by way of compensation. Keepers v.
Yocum et di., 84 Kan. 554, 114 Pac. 1063 (1911). See" also I DART, VENDORS AND PUR-
CHASERS 570 (8th ed. 1929); Note, 16 CALF. L. REv. 541 (1928); Note, 81 A. L. R. 900
(1932); Note, 40 HARV. L. REv. 476 (1927).
31. Sections 358-80 of the Restatement deal with the subject of specific performance.
32. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 365 (1932). See Note, 40 HARv. L. REv. 476, n. 14
(1927). See Radel v. 134 West 25th St. Building Corp., 222 App. Div. 617, 618, 226 N. Y.
Supp. 560, 562 (1st Dep't) (dissenting opinion), dismissed without opinion, 249 N. Y. 615,
164 N. E. 605 (1928). See also POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE §§ 436, 441 (3d ed,
1926); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1436 (rev. ed. 1936); and Note, 76 U. or PA. L. REV.
1008 (1928).
33. N. Y. CODE OF PROCEDURE § 62 (Field Code 1843), now N. Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT
§§ 8, 258; FED. R. Civ. P. 2; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1 (1850); Common Law Proc, Act,
1854, 17 & 18 VicT. c. 125, § 79, culminating in Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 VICT. c. 66.
See MAITLAND, EQUITY 16, 257 (1st ed. 1909).
34. AMiES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 311 (1913).
See also Cox et al. v. City of New York et al., 265 N. Y. 411, 193 N. E. 251 (1934).
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On November 17, 1950, there was reported in the New York Law
Journal a decision which finally cut the Gordian Knot so unintentionally
woven by the early cases. While this was not an appellate decision,
and thus seems at first mention not to be declaratory of the law, its
direct logic and eminent practicality is so consonant with public policy
and the needs of our times that it defies refutation and reversal. It
was the case of Gordon v. Hewlett Harbor Construction, Inc.," tried in
the New York Supreme Court, Tenth Judicial District, by Justice
Charles S. Colden.
The Gordon case arose and was tried in Nassau County, Long Island,
a suburb of New York City and an area in which many construction
contracts have been made in recent years. These have been principally
home building contracts. This case turned on the fact that the builder
was inclined not to perform a contract when it turned out to be un-
profitable to him. Rising prices of materials and labor, after the con-
tract had been signed, made its performance onerous from his point
of view. Besides the then-current state of mounting inflation, the out-
break of hostilities in Korea had sharply accelerated an already rising
level of costs. He reasoned that such great increases in his costs were
difficulties beyond his control, and that therefore he should not be
bound to perform. Justice Colden pointed out that the matter of price
in such a contract is peculiarly within the control of a builder, who
should not be permitted to shirk a bargain when he finds that he has
made a poor one. Then the problem became a practical matter of how
to remedy the non-performance. Damages would not suffice. The
buyer needed a home, and was entitled to receive the home which he
desired and needed. Obviously the remedy of damages, even liberal
damages, would be an inadequate remedy in the conditions prevalent
at the time. Justice Colden decreed that specific performance should
be effectuated by compelling the builder to deliver title to the land,
and to so much of the house as was constructed. In addition the builder
was ordered to pay to the plaintiff such sum of money as would be re-
quired to complete the house as called for in the contract. Moreover,
a referee was to hear and report on any claims for special damages
which the plaintiff could prove. Such a decree, which would have
shocked legal formalists of the past, evokes profound approval from
the practical-minded lawyers of this generation.
35. Oleck, Specific Performance of Builders' Contracts, 125 N. Y. L. J. 22, cal. 1 (Jan.
3, 1951), commented editorially on this case. The keen interest of practiring lawyers in
this case was immediately demonstrated by the correspondence which the article elicited
from the members of the New York bar.
36. 198 Mlisc. 679, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 857 (Sup. CL 1950).
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Specific performance and damages in lieu of specific performance, as
employed in the Gordon case, must be distinguished from its employment
in other situations as abatement rather than as true specific perform-
ance. In the case of World Exhibit Corp. v. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co.,37 mentioned above true inability to perform resulted in a
decree of specific performance with an abatement from the purchase
price.3" In the presence of true inability to perform, such a decree is
sound. But a similar solution in a case involving unwillingness to per-
form would be quite inequitable. It would, in effect, rewrite the con-
tract to suit the convenience of the vendor, which even a court of
equity may not do."9 Similar reasoning applies to situations in which
specific performance is impracticable.4"
It may be argued that the equity court in the Gordon case exceeded
its proper powers; that its "jurisdiction" does not include the authority
to make such a decree as was rendered there. Accordingly, it is ap-
propriate at this point to examine briefly the jurisdiction of courts
of equity.
Jurisdiction, in equity, does not mean the same thing as does the
word jurisdiction, at law. At law the word connotes power and authority
granted by constitutional, or constitutionally created authority, to
a court or judge, to pronounce the provisions of the law, regarding
certain sets of established or provable facts, for or against certain
persons, according to a prescribed procedure. 41 In the absence of such
constitutional power, a pronouncement by the court or judge is a
nullity; in its presence any incorrect pronouncement is valid until
reversed or overruled in proper procedural manner.
42
In equity, jurisdiction means the group or body of types of cases
or controversies which comprise the proper subject matter for the
operation of the powers of courts.43 Often jurisdiction is denied by
equity where the power exists but should not be exercised, because
37. See note 29 uPra.
38. Ibid. See also Note, 21 ST. JonN's L. Rav. 104 (1946). This case turned on a
clause in the contract concerning risk of loss, which now is governed, in New York, by
N. Y. Real Prop. Law § 240 a. See editorial, 116 N. Y. L. J. 338 (Aug. 27, 1946).
39. 58 C. 3. 1221 (1932) ; see also 49 A-M. JuR. 123 (1943).
40. See editorials, 119 N. Y. L. 3. 272, 290 (Jan. 22, 23, 1948).
41. Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254 (1891); Tod et al. v. Crisman ct al., 123
Iowa 693, 99 N. W. 686 (1964); People ex rel. Sandnes v. Sheriff of King's County, 164
Misc. 355, 299 N. Y. Supp. 9 (Sup. Ct. 1937); BLACK, LAW DicT0oNAR 1038 (3d cd.
1933).
42. In re Sawyer et al., 124 U. S. 200 (1888); Tonnele v. Wetmore et a., 195 N. Y. 436,
88 N. E. 1068 (1909).
43. People ex rel. Gaynor v. McKane et al., 78 Hun 154, 28 N. Y. Supp. 981 (Sup. Ct.
1894); BLACK, LAW DicnoNARY 1038 (3d ed. 1933).
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of lack of equitable basis for action.44 In the absence of power, a decree
of equity, like a judgment at law, is a nullity and open to collateral
attack; the absence of equity "jurisdiction" merely means only that
it will be error to use the power, and the decree may be reversed on
appeal." In other words, a decree of equity which is defective for lack
of equity jurisdiction may be attacked only directly, as by appeal,
and stands until reversed or upset.4  Moreover, in general, the defendant
must object to the lack of equity jurisdiction at the beginning of the pro-
ceedings, or be deemed to have waived the defectY But the court itself
also may raise the objection at any stage of the proceedings. 3 In states
which follow the Field Code, such as New York and Minnesota, where
law and equity are combined in one court, the court properly cannot
raise such an objection, which would apply only to the defendant's right
to a jury trial and the form of relief." The defendant may waive jury
trial by failing seasonably to raise objection to the equity jurisdiction,
and the form of relief may be changed easily enough in the code states.P0
In the early days of English chancery, especially prior to the seven-
teenth century, much less reliance was placed on precedent than is
the case today.51 It was said, therefore, that equity consisted in large
part of the exercise of judicial discretion. Today the discretion of equity
courts is rather a customary term than a literal one. Some judicial
discretion (more particularly in the sense of "discreetness") there must
be, but this is not an arbitrary thing, and bears little relation to the
celebrated "Chancellor's Foot" discretion derided by John Selden in
his "Table Talk."52 Discretion is necessary principally in "balancing
44. Fooks' Ex'rs et al. v. Ghingher, 172 Md. 612, 192 AtL 782 (1937); Curtiss v. Brovn,
29 I1. 291 (1862).
45. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U. S. 258 (1947); In re
Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887); Bangs Receiver v. Duckinfield, 18 N. Y. 592 (1859); An-
derson v. Carr et al., 65 Hun 179, 19 N. Y. Supp. 992 (Sup. CL 1892).
46. Sacks v. Stecker, 62 F. 2d 65 (2d Cir. 1932); Miller et al. v. Rowan et al., 2S1
Ill. 344, 96 N. E. 285 (1911).
47. Sexton v. Pike, 13 Ark. 193 (1852); Roe v. Mayor et al. 80 N. J. Eq. 35S, 86
At. 815 (1911).
48. Twist et al. v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 274 U. S. 684 (1927); Hanna et ux. v. R ces
et al., 22 Wash. 6, 60 Pac. 62 (1900).
49. Jackson v. Strong, 222 N. Y. 149, 118 N. E. 512 (1917).
50. Hoff v. Olson, 101 Wis. 118, 76 N. W. 1121 (1898). See Note, 27 Cot.. L. Rav. 66
(1927); also McCrmocn, EQUrr § 41 (2d ed. 1948).
51. 4 Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English Eqtdty in O.Monn STUDMS IN
SocaAL & LEa.L HrsToRY 166 (1914).
52. SELDEN, TABLE TALm 43 (Pollock ed. 1927). See also Mentlikowsld et al. v.
Wisniewski et al., 173 Mich. 642, 139 N. W. 874 (1913); Groesbeck v. Morgan, 206 N. Y.
385, 99 N. E. 1046 (1912).
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the equities," as in cases involving hardship or public policy.'
Much of the nature of specific performance stems from the essentially
"in personam" character of such decrees in equity."' This character-
istic of equity is a result of its ecclesiastical background. The eccle-
siastical courts, having no jurisdiction over property, could act only
by adjudicating the duties of the parties and by compelling the losing
party to obey its decrees. 5 Of course, to some extent the common
law also enforces its orders "in personam" by contempt, as in cases
involving prohibition or mandamus." But equity courts act principally
on the basis of contempt punishment for disobedience. 7 The jurisdiction
of equity is grounded, in most cases, on the circumstance of the person
53. Herzog et a!. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 153 Cal. 496, 95 Pac. 898 (1908);
Southern Ry. v. Franklin & P. R. R., 96 Va. 693, 32 S. E. 485 (1899).
Lawrence, in his treatise on Equity Jurisprudence suggests the following general limita-
tions on the jurisdiction, or employment of the powers of equity:
(1) Only irreparable injuries are the concern of equity. Hermann v. Mexican Petroleum
Corp., 85 N. J. Eq. 367, 96 Atl. 492 (1915). If the legal remedies are adequate there
is no need for equitable assistance. Roe v. Mayor et al., 80 N. J. Eq. 35, 86 Atl. 815
(1911); Pankey v. Ortiz et al., 26 N. M. 575, 195 Pac. 906 (1921). (2) Only substantial
(and not theoretical) claims are the concern of equity. Dubovy v. Woolf et al., 127
Me. 269, 143 At. 58 (1928); Goodrich v. Moore, 2 Minn. 61 (1858). But see BoRCIIARD,
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 1941). (3) Only matters subject to practical control are
the concern of equity. Dixie Grain Co. et al. v. Quinn, 181 Ala. 208, 61 So. 886 (1913).
(4) Matters of primarily political character are not the concern of equity (though equity
does protect public as well as private rights). Duggan v. Emporia, 84 Kan. 429, 114 Pac.
235 (1911) ; Colegrove et al. v. Green et al., 328 U. S. 549 (1946). But see dissent of
Justice Black, id. at 566. See Georgia Trust Co. et al. v. State, 109 Ga. 736, 35 S. E. 323
(1900); and 33 A. L. R. 1370 (1924). (5) Equity should not accept jurisdiction when tile
remedy sought will cause disproportionately great harm to the defendant (unless he Is
guilty of wilful conduct); it must consider the "balance of convenience". Walters v. Mc-
Elroy, 151 Pa. 549, 25 At. 125 (1892); Bochterle v. Saunders, 36 R. I. 39, 88 All. 803
(1913). (6) Equity must limit its jurisdiction so as to conform with public policy. Reed
et vx. v. Johnson et ux., 27 Wash. 42, 67 Pac. 381 (1901). (7) Equity jurisdiction should
be available, where harsh remedial measures are sought (such as injunction, cancellation
or receivership), only when clear and convincing proof (superior to that required at law)
is available. Ralston v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 267 Pa. 257, 110 Atl. 329 (1920) ; Bicklng
v. Florey's Brick Works, 53 Pa. Super. 358 (1913). (8) Equity relief should suit the situ-
ation existing at the time of the issuance of the decree, although any basis for equitable
relief is sufficient to permit the plaintiff to commence the proceeding. Haffey v. Lynch, 143
N. Y. 241, 38 N. E. 298 (1894). 1 LAWRENCE, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 41 (1929).
54. Union Trust Co. v. Olmstead, 102 N. Y. 729, 7 N. E. 822 (1886).
55. LANGDELL, EQUITY PLEADING § 40 (2d ed. 1883), cited in HusON, TnE ENFORCE-
MENT OF DECREES nr EQUITY 75 (1915).
56. Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity: I "In Rem" and "In Personam," 15 CoL.
L. REv. 37 (1915) ; Cook, Powers of Courts of Equity: II Action "In Rem" by Courts of
Equity, 15 CoL. L. REv. 106 (1915); see Note, 30 A. L. R. 148 (1924).
57. Cook, supra note 56.
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of the party to whom its orders are directed being within the power
of the court.55
58. Lord Portarlington . Soulby, 3 My. & K. 104, 40 Eng. Rep. 40 (1834). In like
manner it can command him to do some act relating to property outside its jurisdic-
tion. Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sr. 444, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (1950). Or it can
restrain him from doing an act abroad, Dundas v. Biddle, 2 Pa. 160 (1846), whether
the thing forbidden be a conveyance or other act in pais, or the instituting or prosecu-
tion of an action in a foreign court. Chapman et al. v. American Surety Co., 261 Ill.
594, 104 N. E. 247 (1914). Nor does the full faith and credit provision of the Consti-
tution forbid the court of one county or state thus to prohibit action in another county or
state. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 (1890); Muller v. Dows, 97 U. S. 444 (1876);
Newton v. Bronson, 13 N. Y. 587 (1356); see Note, 35 HARv. L. Rnv. 610 (1922). Dis-
obedience of an order of an equity court is treated as contempt of court. If a defendant
wilfully ignores the authority of the court, all that need be shown is that he knew of
the existence of its order at the time he violated it. Having v. Kauffman, 13 N. J. Eq.
397 (1861). If a defendant is in court when an injunction is granted, he has sufficent
notice of it to make it his duty to respect it. Hull v. Thomas, 3 Edw. Ch. 236 (N. Y.
1838). If he is not in court at that time, but is informed that such an order has been
made, by a person who was in court at the time, he has sufficient notice to be liable for
punishment for disobedience, once the decree or order is entered. E: parle Buskirk, 72
Fed. 14 (4th Cir. 1896); Vansandau v. Rose, 2 Jac. & Walk. 264, 37 Eng. Rep. 628 (1820).
Notice, to be sufficient, must possess two requisites: (1) it must issue from a source
reasonably entitled to be believed, and (2) it must inform the defendant dearly as to
what action or inaction is commanded of him. Cape May & S. L. R.R. v. Johnson et al.,
35 N. J. Eq. 422 (1882). The court may, in vindication of its order, punish wilful vio-
lation thereof, even though the order should not have been granted. Weidner et al. v.
Friedman et al., 126 Tenn. 677, 151 S. W. 56 (1912); Koehler v. Dobberpuhl et a., 56
Wis. 497, 14 N. W. 631 (1883). It should be understood that, although equity acts in
personam, actual action of the person commanded often also is necessary in order for the
court's decree to be effective. Atlantic Seaboard Natural Gas Co. v. Whitten, 315 Pa. 529,
173 Atl. 305 (1934); Anonymous, Jenk. Cent. Cas. 108 (C. P. 1459). A chancery decree
itself was not effective, for example, to convey a title, when the plaintiff had equitable
title and the defendant had legal title. A recalcitrant defendant might prefer prison to
obedience. But today statutes do enable the decrees of an equity court to take effect,
of themselves. Grimmett v. Barnwell, 184 Ga. 461, 192 S. E. 191 (1937). Or they pro-
vide that officials may act in the stead of the defendant. Such statutes are to be strictly
construed, as are any statutes giving to equity courts powers in rem, or their equivalents.
Grimmett v. Barnwell, supra. See also 6 C. J. 93 (1916); 15 C. J. 1391 (1918); and 20
R. C. L. 565 (1929). And if the statutory remedies are full and adequate, there is no
basis for equity jurisdiction. Hope v. Glass, 182 Ga. 514, 15 S. E. 803 (1936); Burress
v. Montgomery, 148 Ga. 543, 97 S. E. 538 (1918). Yet, even statutes may be rendered in-
applicable, by equity, if for example, a party seeks to employ a statutory provision as a
cloak for fraud. Baart v. Martin, 99 Minn. 197, 108 N. W. 945 (1906). In such situations
equity is said to operate on the conscience of the party, in that it will issue such an order
to him as will prevent him from using the statute for a fraudulent purpose. Wirtz v.
Guthrie, 81 N. J. Eq. 271, 87 At. 134 (1913). See 2 Poi.aoy, EQurrz JuprnuD rce
§§ 430-1 (5th ed. 1941). The fact that equity acts in personarn, joined with the fact
of inadequacy of the remedy at law also provide the bases on which equity founds juris-
diction to deal with many-sided cases. While common law courts, partly because of the
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An action for specific performance of a contract to convey real estate
is in personam.59 Originally, specific performance was an action in
personam, as were all proceedings in equity. Suits to foreclose mort-
gages, to partition lands, to quiet titles, and to remove clouds on titles,
all were in personam proceedings, originally. In the course of time,
partly by fhe gradual extension of their jurisdiction by the courts, and
partly by the enactment of statutes, these proceedings have come to
have a dual aspect, partly in personam and partly in rem." Today,
the courts have power to act directly upon property within their juris-
dictions, and by their judgments or decrees to divest one party of legal
title and vest it in another, if that be necessary or proper to a final
determination of the ultimate rights of the parties.01
The jurisdiction in rem, of course, presupposes the existence within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court of a thing or res upon which the
authority is to act. 2 Broadly speaking, decrees which require some
jury system, could accept only two-sided cases, chancery was not so limited. Accord-
ingly today, equity will take jurisdiction of a matter "to prevent a multiplicity of suits."
For example, "bills of peace" may be granted by equity, generally to any party, to settle
an issue common to several threatened suits or actions. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v.
Kilbourne & Clark Manufacturing Co., 235 Fed. 719 (W. D. Wash. 1916); Gulf, C. & S, F.
Ry. v. Pearlstone Mill & Elevator Co., 53 S. W. 2d 1001 (Texas 1932); Earl of Bath et al.
v. Sherwin et al., 1 Brown Parl. Cas. 266 (Ch. 1709). Similarly, "interpleader" stems from
these capacities of equity. Farley v. Blood, 30 N. H. 354 (1854); Post v. Emmett, 40
App. Div. 477, 58 N. Y. Supp. 129 (1st Dep't 1899); Rogers, Historical Origins of Inter-
pleader, 51 YAs.x L. J. 924 (1942); Cohen, Impleader: Enforcement of Defendants' Rights
Against Third Parties, 33 COL. L. Rxv. 1147 (1933).
59. Silver Camp Mining Co. v. Dickert, 31 Iiont. 488, 78 Pac. 967 (1904). But, service
of summons by publication will not warrant a judgment in personam. Ibid. See also
Note, 13 COL. L. Rav. 241 (1913). But see Wharton v. Stoutenbergh, 39 N. J. Eq. 299
(1884).
60. Bush v. Aldrich, 110 S. C. 491, 96 S. E. 922 (1918).
61. Ibid. See also S. C. CODE or Cxv. PROC. § 345. And see Fromholz v. McGahey,
120 Ark. 216, 179 S. W. 360 (1915).
62. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentres, 61 F. 2d 329 (7th Cir. 1932); Seltgmann v. Mills,
25 F. 2d 807 (8th Cir. 1928). The merits of a controversy regarding such property may
be settled on an in rem basis, but usually by plenary proceedings with due hearings,
not by summary proceedings such as ex parte injunction. Arnold v. Bright, 41 Mich. 207,
2 N. W. 16 (1879); Fredericks v. Huber, 180 Pa. 572, 37 Atl. 90 (1897).
Statutes have been enacted in practically every jurisdiction, whereby equity courts
can deal with property in rem. Bush v. Aldrich, 110 S. C. 491, 96 S. E. 922 (1918);
FaD. R. Civ. P. 70; and Storke, Decrees In Rem Under the New Rules, 13 Rocic MT.
L. REv. 140 (1941). As a necessary concomitant of such power the courts have the power
to designate officers or commissioners to take action to make such decrees effective, e.g.,
to convey a title. Promis v. Duke, 208 Cal. 420, 281 Pac. 613 (1929). In some states
express authority is required for each case of in rem jurisdiction. Kinkead v. Clark, 239
S. W. 717 (Tex. 1922). In others the power is implied in certain cases, although not
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personal action or omission by the defendant must remain in personam. 3
In view of the rules and principles sketched in the above summary
or the range and scope of equity jurisdiction, it hardly is to be doubted
that the court was within its authority in its decree in the Gordon case.
It is quite likely that the decree could have been made even more
stringent without straining the authority vested in the court. As a matter
of fact, the same progressive thinking had been evinced several years
earlier" in another, parallel case in New York, which involved com-
mercial property.' The New York courts have taken the lead in over-
coming the traditional reluctance to supervise the execution of building
contracts."
As has been remarked hereinabove, it now is standard practice for
builders to insert protective clauses in their contracts, to provide against
difficulties which may arise as a result of strikes, material shortages,
expressly provided for by statute in the particular situation. Garfein v. McInnis, 248
N. Y. 261, 162 N. E. 73 (1928); Prudential Insurance Co. v. Berry, 153 S. C. 496, 151
S. E. 63 (1930); Tennant's Heirs v. Fretts, 67 W. Va. 569, 68 S. E. 387 (1910).
63. On the other hand, for practically all other types of cases, statutes in most states
now provide that equity's decrees, once made of record, are effective in themzelves as
the bases of title or property rights, or provide for administrative officials to effectuate
such decrees by executing necessary instruments or documents. For a list of the statutes
of the various states see 4 PoarEoY, EQU= JMusraRunEc:E § 1317 n. and § 1434 n.
(5th ed. 1941). Typical cases illustrating the vesting of a legal estate by the equity decree
itself, without any administrative action of any officer, are the following: Title and Docu-
ment Restor. Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 88 Pac. 356 (1906); Price v. Sison, 13
N. J. Eq. 168 (1860); Macklin v. Allenberg, 100 Mo. 37, 13 S. W. 350 (1890). But
these statutes do not abrogate the power of equity courts to operate in personam, except
in a very few specific cases, nor do they have effect outside the territorial jurisdictions
of the respective states. 4 Pouaxmoy, ibid. See also Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464 (U. S.
1870). However, there have been some few cases in which state officers have been per-
mitted to execute conveyances affecting real property outside the state. Promis v. Duke,
208 Cal. 420, 281 Pac. 613 (1929). The tendency of the courts is to extend equity's powers
and jurisdiction in rem. Dodd, Equity Receiverships as Proceedings in Rem, 23 IML L.
R y. 105 (1928).
64. In 1943.
65. Queens Plaza Amusements, Inc. v. Queens Bridge Realty Corp., 259 App. Div.
842, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 206 (2d Dep't 1940) and 265 App. Div. 1057, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 463
(2d Dep't 1943), which latter reversed the Trial Term decision reported 36 N. Y. S. 2d
326 (Sup. Ct. 1942). See Gold, Specific Performance of Builder ,Confracts, 125 N.Y. L. 3.
200, col. 3 (Jan. 17, 1951).
66. See note 65 supra. See Doty v. Rensselaer, 194 App. Div. 841, 185 N. Y. Supp.
466 (3d Dep't 1921), 21 CoL. L. Rav. 495; and St. Regis Paper Co. v. Santa Clara
Lumber Co., 173 N. Y. 149, 65 N. E. 967 (1903), which stated that "the time over which
a contract extends is not necessarily controlling as to specific performance." Id. at 160,
65 N. E. at 970. See also City of New York v. New York Central R.R., 275 N. Y. 287,
9 N. E. 2d 931 (1937); and Jones v. Seligman, 81 N. Y. 191 (1880), affirming, 16 Hun
230 (N. Y. 1878).
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and the like. These clauses usually provide that the buyer is to recover
only his deposit, and no damages, in case the builder fails to complete
the work because of strikes, unobtainability of materials, "and other
causes beyond the builder's control." The Gordon case pointed up the
dangers inherent in the phrase "beyond the builder's control." But an-
other problem is involved in the use of clauses exculpating the seller
for failure to perform "for any reason." This latter phrase also has
been used in a number of contracts, and promises to be even more
widely employed as a result of the Gordon case."
However, the difficulty suggested by the interchange of these phrases
is more seeming than real. They create two seemingly similar, but
actually different types of contracts. First, there are contracts which
provide that the builder need only return the buyer's deposit if the
builder cannot perform for any reason "beyond his control." Secondly,
there are those contracts which provide that the builder need only return
the deposit should he default "for any reason." The latter type of
contract seems to be clearly beyond the reach of equity's remedy. A
termination of this latter type of contract is not a breach, but an observ-
ance of the terms of the contract.68 If equity were to attempt to inter-
vene it would be making a new contract, not enforcing the contract
entered into by the parties.
The real difficulty lies in contracts which seek to employ subtle
shadings of language rather than the clear and direct phrases mentioned
here. Once it has been determined into which of the two categories
a contract falls, the applicable legal principles are clear.00 If Gordon
v. Hewlett Harbor accomplishes nothing else, it will compel the use
of clearer and more easily understood exculpatory language in contracts.
And that, in itself, is a consummation devoutly to be wished. But, much
more likely, the Gordon case will break, once and for "all, the grip of
the dead hand of a tradition that has long outlived its purpose.10 Roscoe
Pound's admonition regarding specific performance of construction con-
tracts seems to have been heeded, at last.
Gordon v. Hewlett Harbor Construction was cited by Mr. Justice
Keogh in a late 1951 decision 7 as an example of equity's acceptance
of jurisdiction of cases of "quality or quantity of performance," in which
67. Hart, Specific Performance of Builders' Contracts, 125 N. Y. L. J. 72, col. 3 (Jan.
8, 1951).
68. Clark, Specific Performance of Builders' Contracts, 125 N. Y. L. J. 220, col. 2 (Jan.
18, 1951).
69. Ibid.
70. STONE, PROVINCE AND FUNCTiON OF LAW 546 (1950).
71. Savitt v. Roncave Homes, Inc., 126 N. Y. L. J. 1750, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 24,
1951).
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equity will "make adjustments." Nevertheless, he added that this
might well be "generally by way of an abatement in price." - This
implies, in effect, utilization of abatement to grant what is specific
performance in substance, as in the Gordon case.
Another case in the same court shortly after the Gordon decision,
and very similar to it, was Cherot v. Nat. Constructors, Inc." decided
by Mr. Justice Hooley. He granted summary judgment for the plaintiff-
vendee, on the same basis as was done in the Gordon case, but without
citing that decision.
The modern view of all specific performance of contracts is strikingly
illustrated by the following example: In late 1951 the American Arbitra-
tion Journal published an article7 4 which suggested that desired specific
relief could be obtained despite the traditional reluctance of courts to
grant it, by the use of arbitration. Arbitrators are not as constrained
by legal tradition, in this respect. And an arbitrator's award of specific
performance, if otherwise in due form, is enforceable by court order."
Thus the inclusion of an arbitration clause in a contract, or later agree-
ment to arbitrate, could secure the desired remedy.
This note, though almost casual in form and brevity, was picked up and
broadcast by the Law Review Digest.71 A short time thereafter,'
apparently by coincidence, the writer was asked to arbitrate a demand
by a reputable publishing house for specific performance of a contract
to write a very learned book, on a technical subject, by a world-famous
scholar. Specific performance of a contract so subject to the "super-
vision" requirement probably would have been refused by practically
every court, even today. By actual agreement of the parties, specific
performance was ordered, with extension of time to perform, and a
heavy penalty in case of default. The formal award was made to this
effect,71 to the expressed satisfaction of both parties.
It is clear that, although they have made great progress recently, the
courts still are far behind the public's desire for liberal granting of
specific relief even when prolonged supervision may be necessary.
72. Citing Warren v. Hoch et at., 276 App. Div. 607, 609, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 832
(2d Dep't 1950).
73. 125 N. Y. L. J. 1936, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. May 24, 1951).
74. Oleck, Specific Per!ornnce of Contracts Through Arbitration, 6 Anm. 3. (!..s.) 163
(1951).
75. Note, Court Orders Specific Compliance of Award, 2 Ann. NEws 2 (1952), regard-
ing a State Mediation Board award, enforced by Justice Samuel H. Hofstadter of the
N. Y. Supreme Court.
76. 2 LAw Rav. DIG. 1 (1951).
77. February, 1952.
78. Case C-10079, AiiyRa. ARB. AssN. (1952).
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